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TRADE AND MIGRATION IN NORTH
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF NAFTA
James F. Hollifield and Thomas Osang*
I. INTRODUCTION
T the end of 2003, the North American Free Trade Agreement
turned ten years old. With two-thirds of its implementation pe-
riod passed, one may ask whether NAFTA has served its main
purpose-to facilitate and strengthen the flow of goods and services be-
tween Canada, Mexico, and the United States. A related question con-
cerns the impact NAFTA may have had on the flow of immigrants
between its three member countries. After all, a commonly made asser-
tion among those policy makers supporting NAFTA was that increased
commercial relations in North-America, and in particular between the
United States and Mexico, should and would reduce incentives for South-
North migration, both legal and illegal. The ten year anniversary of
NAFTA brings up a third issue closely related to the previous two: has
the process of trade liberalization set in motion by NAFTA improved the
living standards of the 430 million people living in North-America.
The public debate over the impact of NAFTA (and other trade agree-
ments) often centers on non-informative and sometimes even misleading
facts and figures. Proponents of NAFTA typically refer to the growth in
the volume of trade, the rise in border-crossings, and the increase in jobs
and income as evidence for the beneficial impact of NAFTA (see, for
example, a recently produced pamphlet (Trade Facts, 2003) published by
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the Office of the United States Trade Representative). Critics of free
trade agreements such as NAFTA, on the other side, point to equally
information-void numbers showing the recent decline in jobs and output
in select industries such as furniture, textiles, and steel and interpreting
the observed decline as evidence for the adverse effects of NAFTA (see,
for example, statements by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on NAFTA
and similar agreements (After NAFTA, FTAA Could Bring More Disas-
ter, 2002)).
Simple changes in aggregate indicators are insufficient evidence for or
against free trade agreements for at least three reasons: (1) since econo-
mies are typically growing over time, we expect the volume of trade, em-
ployment, and income to grow as well; (2) for the last couple of decades,
we observe a worldwide increase in the volume of exports and imports
relative to gross domestic product (GDP), the so-called trade share.
Therefore, a post-agreement rise in the trade share by itself cannot be
used as evidence in support of trade agreements; and (3) both at the ag-
gregate and disaggregate level factors other than trade agreements -
such as changes in exchange rates, transport costs, and technological
change-need to be controlled for before we can come to more definite
conclusions about the impact of NAFTA and similar agreements.
In this paper, we compare and contrast trade and migration indicators
for pre- and post-NAFTA periods. To avoid some of the previously men-
tioned pitfalls, we construct trade and migration ratios rather than using
levels. Next, to control for existing secular trends in these ratios we cal-
culate the change of trade and migration ratios. Next, we construct aver-
age annual growth rates for both pre-and post-NAFTA periods. Finally,
we compare the after-1994 with the pre-1994 average annual growth rate.
Positive NAFTA effects on trade and migration are then consistent with a
larger post-NAFTA annual growth rate (i.e., a positive growth between
the two growth rates), while the reverse is true for smaller post-1994
growth rate. Where available, we compare our findings to multi-variate
regression estimates from existing empirical studies. These more elabo-
rate studies have the advantage that they can include factors not con-
trolled for in our analysis that vary substantially between the pre- and the
post-NAFTA periods.
Our findings point to a positive impact of NAFTA on aggregate trade
flows between all three countries, and in particular between Mexico and
the United States. But at a more disaggregate level, NAFTA appears to
have a positive trade impact on no more than half of the industries ana-
lyzed. With regard to legal migration, we do not find a noticeable
NAFTA impact on long-term trends, while the short-run impact is more
difficult to assess due to competing factors such as changes in immigra-
tion laws and business cycle patterns. Finally, there is little evidence for a
positive or negative relationship between the change in trade flows and
the change in legal migration patterns both before and after NAFTA
went into effect.
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II. IMPACT OF NAFTA - LITERATURE SURVEY
The empirical literature of the economic impact of NAFTA, and in par-
ticular on trade in goods and services, is only beginning to emerge. Re-
cent econometric studies that examined the economic impact of trade
agreements such as NAFTA include Frankel (1997), Gould (1998), Krue-
ger (1999), Baier and Bergstrand (2001) Romalis (2001), Agama and
Daniels (2003), and USITC (2003). These studies estimate models that
relate trade measures (such as the growth in the volume of trade or the
ratio of imports from a select country to overall imports) to a set of ex-
planatory factors that vary from model to model. However, ail specifica-
tions have in common that they include some direct or indirect measure
of barriers to trade. The estimated coefficient on the trade-barrier varia-
ble can then be used to gauge the impact of a specific trade agreement on
the chosen trade measure.
It is fair to say that recent empirical studies of NAFTA produced some-
what mixed results with regard to the trade impact of NAFTA. While
some show gains in the volume of regional trade among all Parties
(Romalis, 2001), others find little evidence that NAFTA increased North
American trade at the aggregate level at all (Krueger, 1999). In between
these extremes are studies that find NAFTA to be effective in stimulating
U.S.-Mexico trade in both directions, while leaving Canada-U.S. and
Mexico-Canada trade essentially unchanged (USITC (1997, 2003); Gould
(1998); Agama and McDaniel (2003)). The finding that NAFTA had lit-
tle impact on Canada-U.S. trade may not be that surprising given that the
two countries had already lowered or even eliminated many trade barri-
ers before NAFTA became effective due to their bilateral free trade
agreement (CUSFTA).1
III. CHANGES IN TRADE FLOWS
A. AGGREGATE CHANGE
Figure 1 shows the ratio of total trade (sum of exports and imports) to
GDP for the three NAFTA countries from 1965 to 2001. Clearly, there is
more or less steady increase in the trade share in all countries. Interest-
ingly, the share begins to rise more rapidly in Canada from 1992 onward
and in Mexico after 1995. In contrast, the U.S. trade share shows no no-
ticeable jump or change in slope throughout the nineties. Table 1 gives
average annual growth rates of trade shares over the entire sample period
(1965-2001) as well as for pre-NAFTA (1965-1993) and post-NAFTA
(1994-2001) years. Notice first that the average annual growth rate of the
trade share is quite similar across the three countries, ranging from 2.3
percent in Canada to 2.7 percent in the United States, with the Mexican
rate in between these two at 2.5 percent. But this similarity breaks down
when we compare the two sub-periods. The U.S. trade share growth rate
1. For studies that analyze the impact of CUSFTA, see Trefler (2001) and Causing
(2001).
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is twice as high during the pre-NAFTA period compared to the post-
NAFTA period (3 percent versus 1.5 percent), while the opposite is true
for both Mexico and Canada. Both countries' post-NAFTA growth rate
is more than twice as high as the pre-NAFTA rate (4.7 percent versus 1.9
percent in Mexico, 3.9 percent versus 1.9 percent in Canada). Removal
of the year 2001, characterized by a strong decline of trade flows relative
to GDP in all three countries, produces an even more striking picture.
During the 1994-2000 period, the Mexican trade share grew at an average
rate 6.1 percent per year, more than three times its pre-NAFTA value,
while the Canadian share grew at an annual rate of 5.2 percent, more
than two and half times its pre-1994 rate. Without 2001, even the U.S.
trade share grew at rate that was slightly above its pre-1994 value.
Figures 2a-c show the time profile of U.S. exports, imports, and total
trade with Mexico and Canada, relative to exports, imports, and total
trade with all countries (including NAFTA partners) over the 1985-2003
period. Figure 2a and b clearly show the greater importance of the Cana-
dian market for U.S. exports and imports with shares that exceed 14 per-
cent in every period, while Mexican shares are typically below 10 percent.
But while Canadian export and import shares are mostly flat over time,
the Mexican shares trend upward, with beginning values around 4 percent
and ending values close to 10 percent. A similar pattern holds for the
U.S. total trade shares with Canada and Mexico depicted in Figure 2c.
The rise in the NAFTA total trade share (defined as U.S. exports and
imports with both Canada and Mexico relative to U.S. exports and im-
ports with all countries) from values that hover around 20 percent to val-
ues around 25 percent begins more or less at the time NAFTA came into
effect. Table 2 provides further clarification on the issue. For the entire
sample period from 1986 to 2003, U.S. import, export and total trade
shares with Mexico grew at an average annual rate of 4 percent, while the
corresponding rates with Canada are essentially zero or even slightly neg-
ative. A comparison of pre- with post-1994 annual rates reveals that U.S.
export share with Mexico were unaffected by NAFTA, while import
share growth almost doubled (from 2.4 percent pre to 5 percent post).
Post-NAFTA export and import share growth rates with Canada are
larger (positive or less negative) than pre-1994 rates, but the difference is
not very pronounced (an absolute change of +1.2 percent for the export
share and +0.4 percent for the import share). Driven by the strong in-
crease in imports from Mexico, the U.S. total trade share with NAFTA
partners grew at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent post-1994, a seven-
fold increase over the 0.2 percent annual growth rate from 1986 to 1993.
Excluding the impact of the recent global recession, the post-NAFTA an-
nual growth rate of the U.S. total trade share with Canada and Mexico is
even more impressive at 2.7 percent.
Our previous analysis fails to control for certain factors that influence
trade shares such as exchange rate fluctuations and changes in transport
costs. As long as average annual changes in these variables are similar
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over the pre-and post 1994 periods, our analysis is still valid even if we
included these other factors. But it is quite possible that the secular de-
cline in transport costs may have accelerated since the mid-nineties, and
the decline in the value of the peso against the dollar beginning with the
1994 peso crises is a well-established fact. A simple empirical model that
tries to capture tariff and other effects on trade is given in equation (1),
taken from USITC (2003):
MUS /MS =f(pM pr1d (1)
Equation (1) gives the ratio of imports of a particular product from a
foreign country (say, Mexico) by the United States to imports of that
product from all countries as a function of the ratio between the Mexican
and the world market price. Each import price itself is a function four
components (see equation (2)): the actual price of the imported product
(P*); the tariff applied to the imported product (T); the markup due to
transport costs (TR); and the exchange rate that translates the foreign
price into U.S. dollars (E).
PM = f (P*, T, TR, E) (2)
The empirical model that is actually estimated is often augmented by
additional covariates such as the tariff level (to control for the fact that
industries with high tariff barriers have smaller import share regardless of
the relative tariff differential between Mexico and the world), a lagged
dependent variable (to control for the fact that markets need time to ad-
just after a policy change occurred), and higher-level industry dummies
(to control for unobserved industry heterogeneity).
The results reported in USITC (2003) are reproduced in Table 3. The
estimation results clearly indicate that tariff preference (defined as the
tariff differential between the tariffs on world imports and the tariff on
Mexican imports) had a positive and significant impact on U.S. imports
from Mexico. Furthermore, this effect was even stronger in post-NAFTA
years, just as expected from our previous analysis. Industries with high
absolute tariff levels had lower import shares, as expected. This adverse
relationship was slightly less pronounced in the post-NAFTA period.
Transportation costs had the expected strong negative impact on Mex-
ico's import share, while lagged imports had small positive, though highly
statistically significant impact on current import. An increase in the peso-
dollar exchange rate, equivalent to a depreciation of the peso against the
dollar, makes Mexican imports relative cheaper and improves the Mexi-
can import share. Similarly, a rise in the effective exchange rate makes
world imports cheaper and thus lowers U.S. imports from Mexico. A
higher Mexican export price lowers the Mexican share of the U.S. import
market, as one would expect. The only unexpected sign of any coefficient
estimate is the decline in the Mexican export share as the result of an
2005]
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increase in the world market price, perhaps the result of some interde-
pendence between the world market and the Mexican market.
Figures 3a-c depict the share of U.S. and Mexican merchandise imports
and exports in the Canadian market for the period 1988-2001. The dis-
crepancy between the importance of the Mexican versus the U.S. market
for Canadian trade relations is evident and well known. However, for
our purpose, changes over time are more important than cross-country
differences in levels. While the percentage of Canadian exports to the
U.S. market is rising steadily (from 70 percent in 1988 to more than 80
percent in 2001), the U.S. share of Canadian import market appears to be
flat at best, with values between 60 percent and 70 percent. The opposite
is true for Canada-Mexico trade relations. The Mexican share of the Ca-
nadian import market is rising steadily (from less than 1 percent in 1988
to about 4 percent in 2001), but the share of Canadian exports going to
Mexico is persistently less than 1 percent throughout the sample period.
Therefore, increases in Canadian exports to the United States and Cana-
dian imports from Mexico are what drive the changes in the Canada's
total trade share with NAFTA partners (Figure 3c). Table 4 provides the
corresponding average annual growth rates for Canada's trade shares.
Between 1988 and 2001, Canada's export share with the United States
grew at annual rate of 1.5 percent, while the import share growth rate was
slightly negative. As a result, the total trade share grew at a small posi-
tive annual rate of 0.7 percent. Clearly, NAFTA did not speed up the
process of trade integration for Canada, with both import and export
share growth lower during the post-1994 period. As a result, the annual
growth rate the Canadian total trade share with the United States after
1994 was only half its previous value, falling from I percent per year to
0.5 percent. The results for trade share growth with Mexico are mixed.
For the 1994-2001 period, the share of Canada's export to Mexico grew at
rate that was almost twice its pre-1994 value (7.7 percent per year versus
4.3 percent). But import share growth declined, from 13.9 percent per
year pre-1994 to 7 percent thereafter. As a result, the growth rate of
Canada's total trade share with Mexico also declined. With both post-
1994 growth rates lower than the pre-1994 rates, it comes as no surprise
that Canada's total share growth with NAFTA partners was lower during
the NAFTA period (0.6 percent compared to 1.1 percent from 1988-1993)
were flat or even.
Figures 4a-c depict the pre-and post-NAFTA experience for Mexico in
terms of changes in trade shares. As is the case with Canada, the impor-
tance of the U.S. market for Mexican exports and imports stands in
strong contrast to the small size of the trade volume with Canada (unfor-
tunately, data for trade in goods and services with Canada were only
available from 1994 onward). Figures 4a and b indicate an inverse pat-
tern for Mexico's trade with the United States: while the share of Mexi-
can goods exported to the U.S. market grew steadily (from 60 percent in
1985 to almost 80 percent in 2002), the U.S. share of the Mexican import
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market is more or less stable, with values between 50 percent and 60 per-
cent. Thus, driven by export share growth, Mexico's NAFTA trade share
is growing over time (Figure 4c). Data on annualized growth rates are
given in Table 5. Both export and import share growth rates for U.S.-
Mexican trade are higher during the 1994-2002 period, with export share
growth at 0.8 percent per year prior to 1994 and 2 percent afterwards.
Import share growth rate are negative both before and after 1994, but the
decline is somewhat smaller during the NAFTA period. In addition, if
the recession years 2001-2002 are excluded, the import growth rate is
strongly positive, with a value of 1.1 percent per year. With regard to
Canada, Mexico experienced a decline of 3.1 percent per year of the Ca-
nadian share of its export market in the post-1994 period. In contrast, the
share of Canadian imports in the Mexican import market grew by 5.5
percent annually between 1994 and 2002. Overall, total trade shares with
the United States grew at 1.1 percent during the NAFTA period, com-
pared to zero growth for the pre-NAFTA period. Mexico's total trade
with Canada and with both NAFTA partners grew at 0.9 percent and 1
percent, respectively, during the 1994-2002 period.
Table 6 shows estimation results, reported in USITC (2003), explaining
the determinants of the U.S. share of the Mexican import market. As in
Table 3, only manufacturing industries at the six-digit HTS level are con-
sidered. Due to data restrictions, only three time periods are being in-
cluded in the sample: 1991, 1995, and 1999. Also, data limitations restrict
the number of covariates to five (in contrast to Table 3, transport costs
and import prices variables are not included). Despite these shortcom-
ings, Table 6 shows that after controlling for past tariff levels, past import
shares, and exchange rate effects, higher relative tariffs on world imports
increase the U.S. share of the Mexican market. Table 6 also explains why
the U.S. market share in Mexico did not grow faster than 2.5 percent
between 1991 and 1999 despite substantial reductions in Mexican tariff
rates on U.S. imports of about 10 percent over the same time period.
Multiplying the estimated elasticity of the peso-dollar exchange rate of
-0.05 by 230 (the percent decline of the peso against the dollar during the
1991-1999 period) yields -11.5 percent. Thus, the peso devaluation took
away 11.5 percent from the combined effect of tariff preference and lower
tariff levels, leaving a total effect of 2.5 percent.
B. SEcrOR-SPECIFIC CHANGE
While aggregate analysis of trade agreements is a natural first choice, a
sector-specific approach is equally important to gain knowledge about the
distribution of trade policy induced changes across industries. Following
the USITC report (2003), we consider pre-and post-NAFTA trade share
indicators for ten industries: agriculture, forest and fishery products,
chemical and allied products, energy and fuel products, minerals and
metal products, transport equipment, textiles and apparel, machinery and
electronic products, services, and misc. products.
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Tables 6a-c rank these ten industries by the absolute change in the
growth rate of NAFTA export, import, and total trade shares for the
United States between the 1987-1993 period and the 1994-2001 period. A
positive sign indicates that the particular industries managed to accelerate
the growth rate of its NAFTA trade share, while a negative sign implies
the opposite. Table 6a shows that the industry with the strongest pre-to
post-NAFTA export growth gain was energy and fuel products (+18.95
percent), followed by minerals and metal products (+7 percent) and
transport equipment (+4.4 percent). Interestingly, five industries had
post-NAFTA period growth rates below pre-1994 period averages, with
misc. products experiencing the strongest absolute percent decline (-9.9
percent), followed by agriculture (-8.2 percent) and chemical and allied
products (-4.1 percent). Surprisingly, the U.S. textiles and apparel indus-
try, one of the "loser" industries according to AFL-CIO documents, was
able to expand its NAFTA exports share at a faster pace in the post-1994
period than in the previous period.
Of the ten industries, only two (services and misc. products) had a
NAFTA period export share growth rate that was negative (i.e., U.S.
firms exported less services and misc. products to NAFTA partners rela-
tive to all countries in 2001 than in 1994). The results may indicate that
trade liberalization in services (and misc. products) progressed at a faster
pace outside of North America.
Table 6b shows the corresponding ranking of U.S. industries by
changes in the import share growth rate. Except for services, all indus-
tries experienced a positive average annual growth rate of import shares
with NAFTA partners. However, the pace of the regional integration
process slowed down in six of the ten industries during the NAFTA-pe-
riod compared to the pre-NAFTA period. The strongest growth gain in
the post-to pre NAFTA comparison occurred in machinery and electronic
products (+3 percent) followed by forest and fishery (+1.5 percent) and
services (+1.2 percent). On the other end of the distribution, the process
of U.S. import integration with NAFTA partners slowed down most se-
verely during the NAFTA period for textiles and apparel (-7.9 percent),
agriculture (-6.1 percent), and transport and equipment (-4.9 percent).
Table 6c ranks industries by changes in the growth rate of the total
trade share. Only one industry (services) experienced a declining
NAFTA total trade share during the NAFTA period, but seven industries
saw a slow-down in growth during the 1994-2001 period. Forest and fish-
ery products (+3.4 percent) saw the strongest acceleration of total trade
share growth during the NAFTA years, while textiles and apparel saw the
strongest slowdown (-10.5 percent).
NAFTA trade, in particular with Canada, accounts for a substantial
fraction of overall trade in U.S. forestry and fishery products. In 2001,
more than four-fifths of U.S. sector imports came from Canada and Mex-
ico, and more than two-fifths of U.S. exports went to NAFTA partners.
In comparison, U.S. sector exports to Canada and Mexico accounted for
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slightly more than half of total exports in 1993, while sector imports from
the two countries made up less than one-third of total imports. This
strong growth in sector trade with NAFFA partners stands in contrast to
a decline in trade with non-NAFTA countries. Between 1993 and 2001,
U.S. sector exports to non-NAFTA countries declined by more than 50
percent, while imports fell by more than 20 percent. This diversion of
trade flows cannot be explained by a change in U.S. tariff rates since rates
were close to zero before NAFTA came into effect.
With respect to exports, the U.S. textile and apparel industry is strongly
NAFTA dependent with about half of total exports going to either Ca-
nada or Mexico in 2001. The picture is different for imports: less than
one-fifth of sector imports come from NAFTA countries. However, im-
ports from NAFTA partners grew at more than twice the rate of exports
to NAFTA partners between 1993 and 2001, mostly due to strong in-
creases in apparel imports from Mexico. In contrast, the U.S textile in-
dustry has benefited from NAFTA by expanding exports to both Mexico
and Canada, especially of high-quality textiles. The strong slowdown in
total trade share growth during 1994-2001 is in part the result of the ex-
tremely high growth rates of the pre-NAFTA period, where total trade
share with NAFTA partners grew at average annual rate of 18.5 percent,
far higher than for any other U.S. industry (mean reversion effect).
IV. CHANGES IN MIGRATION FLOWS
A. LONG-RUN CHANGES IN LEGAL IMMIGRATION FROM CANADA
AND MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES
Figure 5a shows the time profile of the Canadian and Mexican share of
all legal U.S. immigrants per decade for the period 1820 to 2000. Cana-
dian immigration peaked in the decade between 1921 and 1930, reaching
a share of 22.5 percent, but has been on a steady decline since. The share
of Canadian and Mexican immigration to the United States has changed
dramatically in the last century and a half, with Canadians being far more
important in the Third Wave from roughly the mid-nineteenth century
until the end of the 1950s. Both Mexican and Canadian immigration to
the United States increased in the early twentieth century as steps were
taken to halt the influx of Asians (Chinese Exclusion in 1882) and
Europeans (World War I and the advent of the National Origins Quota
system in 1924).
In the last two decades of the 20th century, the Canadian immigration
share was flat at 2.1 percent. In contrast, the Mexican share of U.S. immi-
grants was close to zero throughout the 19th century, but has been rising
steadily, with one exception, since 1900. After a local peak of 11.2 per-
cent in 1921-1930, the Mexican immigrant share fell to 4.2 percent during
the subsequent decade of international disintegration. Since then it has
been rising in each decade, reaching its all time high of 24.7 percent dur7
ing the 1990s. Adding up the Mexican and Canadian immigrant shares
creates what could be called the "NAFTA" share of U.S. immigrants (Fig-
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ure 5b). After reaching its all time high of close to 35 percent in 1921-
1930, the "NAFTA" share has been rather stable-with the exception of
the 1960s-at a level around 25 percent. It is safe to say that Canada and
Mexico became the most important sources of immigrant labor for the
United States as the two World Wars cut the United States off from its
traditional supplies of labor in Europe, and policy became increasingly
restrictive in the 1920s (see Figure 5b). Even during the Great Depres-
sion, as immigration came to a near halt, Mexico and Canada remained
important source countries.
After World War II, with the Bracero program in full swing and the
U.S. economy booming, we see a reversal in the shares of Mexican and
Canadian immigration to the U.S. (see Figure 5a), with Mexico quickly
surpassing Canada in the 1960s. Canadian shares fall to an almost negli-
gible level in the 1970s as the source of immigrants began to diversify
following passage of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965. By the 1980s, Asia had
become increasingly important as a sending region, but as we can see
from Figure 5c, the overall share of the Americas rises continually from
the beginning to the end of the twentieth century.
B. SHORT-RUN CHANGE
Focusing only on the Fourth Wave, particularly the decade or so pre-
and post-NAFTA, we see a sharp rise in total levels of legal immigration
(Figure 6a) due to the IRCA legalization of 1986, and then the numbers
stabilize around 1 million/year throughout the 1990s. What these trends
do not capture, of course, are the levels of illegal immigration (the ele-
phant in the room!), with Mexico being the predominant source country.
Estimates are that approximately 300,000 unauthorized immigrants en-
tered the country (or overstayed their visas) each year during this period.
Given the relative short period of six years during which NAFTA may
have had an impact on legal immigration flows (and the lack of reliable
data on flows of illegals), it is too early to tell whether a structural break
occurred in the time series of the NAFTA share around in 1994.2 But
given the modest increase in the "NAFTA"-immigration share during the
1990s, it seems unlikely at this point that NAFrA triggered such a struc-
tural break. Figure c supports this view. The "Americas" share of U.S.
immigrants is the ratio of all U.S. immigrants from North, Central, and
South America to all U.S. immigrants. In three of the last four decades,
this share has been close to 50 percent (with a local trough in the 1960s),
a pattern that mirrors that of the "NAFTA" share. Thus, long-run immi-
gration shares seem to follow a pattern that is not easily altered by re-
gional free trade agreements.
2. Note that parametric tests for structural tests such CUSUM (Brown at al, 1975)
have typically low power against local shifts of parameters in small samples. Baye-
sian flat prior tests for an unknown structural break (Kim, 1991) have relatively
good small sample properties, but the reliability of the test is poor at the sample
border (the case of testing for a NAFTA-induced structural break).
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Figures 6a presents the short run time profile of total legal U.S. immi-
grants from 1986 to 2002. The cyclical nature of this flow of immigrants
over the short run is made evident by the fitted third degree polynomial
also shown in the graph. Clearly, U.S. immigration is on the rise after
reaching a local trough in 1998-1999, but immigration was rising even
stronger from 1986 to 1991, mainly due the effect of IRCA (1986) that
granted amnesty to illegal aliens in the United States.
Figures 6b and c show a similar cyclical pattern for U.S. immigrants
from Mexico and Canada, respectively. In both cases, third degree poly-
nomials fit the observed pattern rather well. The main difference be-
tween Canadian and Mexican immigration to the United States occurred
in the early 1990s where Mexican illegal immigrants took advantage of
the amnesty program, while Canadian immigration numbers were flat
due to the lack of a large number of illegal Canadian immigrants.
Figures 6d and e depict the share of Mexican and Canadian immigrants
among U.S. immigrants from 1986 to 2002. For Mexican immigration
shares, we observe the same cyclical pattern that we find for immigration
levels, both overall and for Mexico. This indicates that while Mexican
immigration patterns are in line with overall immigration flows, the num-
ber of Mexican immigrants seems to fluctuate more than overall immigra-
tion. As a result, the share of Mexican immigrants went from a low near
10 percent in 1986 to a maximum of more than 50 percent in 1991 to a
low of another low near 10 percent in 1994 before settling around its cur-
rent 20 percent level. Again, it is important to keep in mind that we are
looking only at legal immigration from Mexico.
The Canadian immigration share displays an altogether different pat-
tern. First of all, it is more stable than the Mexican share varying mostly
between 1 percent and 2 percent of overall U.S. immigration. Secondly,
it reached an overall minimum in 1991 with a value close to 0.5 percent.
Finally, there are three local maxima in 1987, in 1994, and in 2001, all of
them near the 2 percent mark. Thus fitted 4th order polynomial is mostly
flat after 1994, with a small increase after 1999.
As with long-term analysis, it is difficult to tell whether NAFTA caused
a structural break in pattern of Mexican and Canadian immigration to the
United States. But given the relative modest changes we observe since
1994 compared to the pre-1994 period, it appears that changes in immi-
gration policies such as the amnesty program of the late 1980s are more
likely candidates for break points than the implementation of NAFTA in
1994.
Table 8 compares pre- and post-NAFTA annual average growth rates
of immigration shares for Mexico, Canada, and NAFTA. All immigration
shares grew at positive rate from 1986-2002, with Mexico's immigration
share growth rate of 11.2 percent almost three times as high as that of
Canada (4.2 percent). During the pre-NAFTA period (1986-1993), Mex-
ico's immigration share grew at an annual rate of almost 17 percent, com-
pared to rate of almost 7 percent during the post-1994 period. A similar
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pattern emerges for Canada-strong average growth rates of the immi-
gration share between 1986 and 1993 (8.5 percent) compared to anemic
growth thereafter (0.8 percent). Growth of the NAFTA immigration
share follows the pattern of the Canadian and Mexican shares, with aver-
age annual growth rates almost three times higher during the pre-
NAFTA period.
While the results in Table 8 do not rule out that NAFTA played a posi-
tive role in stimulating Canadian and Mexican immigration shares due to
the lack of controls for other determinants of migration flows such as
changes in immigration laws, changes in transport costs, business cycle
effects, it seems unlikely that controlling for these factors would reverse
our principal finding that so far NAFTA had no discernable influence on
migration trends in North-America.
What about the contemporaneous relationship between trade and mi-
gration? Figure 7a shows a scatter plot of the growth rate of the Mexican
share of U.S. immigrants against the growth rate of the Mexican trade
share in total U.S. trade. Figure 7b does the same for Canada. If changes
in immigration shares and changes in trade shares were strongly corre-
lated, we would expect all data points to be located in the upper right and
lower left quadrant. However, the two graphs reveal that there is no
clear pattern in the scatter plot since observations are distributed across
all four quadrants. Table 8 confirms this result. First, the correlation co-
efficient for the 1985-2002 period is small (0.19 for Mexico and 0.09 for
Canada). Second, while the estimated bivariate relationship between
trade and immigration share growth is positive, it is not significantly dif-
ferent from 0.
Did NAFIA change this non-relationship? Clearly not, as Table 8
reveals. Neither during the pre-1994 nor during the post-1994 period was
there a statistically significant positive correlation between these two
growth rates. In addition, in the case of Canada, the correlation was even
negative during the post-1994 period, though again not significant. While
it is possible that a multi-variate approach could come to a different con-
clusion, it seems unlikely that this would happen given the weakness of
the bivariate correlation.
V. WINNERS AND LOSERS: THE IMPACT OF NAFTA ON
GROWTH AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN MEXICO
As shown in section 3, NAFTA has had a significant, positive effect on
the volume of trade between Mexico and the United States, reinforcing
pre-existing trends. Moreover, in section 4 we find no discernible impact
on levels of legal immigration from Mexico. Nonetheless, Philip Martin
(2004) predicts that increased economic integration will lead to a "migra-
tion hump," where emigration from Mexico will increase rapidly in the
short to medium term, then fall just as quickly as factor-prices begin to
equalize. Another way of stating this "hump argument" is that trade and
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migration are complements in the short term, but substitutes in the long
term.
While these two findings appear contradictory, they can be reconciled
if we take into account the potentially important impact of illegal immi-
gration. Our working hypothesis is that illegal immigration is more sensi-
tive to wage or income inequalities than legal immigration.
Inequalities both within and between the three NAFTA countries, es-
pecially Mexico and the United States, are likely to grow with the initial
integration of factor markets, which will provoke shifts in comparative
advantage, followed by a rapid cycle of industrialization in some regions,
especially along the U.S.-Mexican border, and a rural exodus from very
poor agricultural areas in central and southern Mexico. The logical way
for markets to adjust (clear) is for unskilled workers, particularly farmers
leaving the agricultural sector in Mexico, to move to the cities, especially
the capitol, Mexico City, then to the border areas, and on to the United
States. In this scenario, migration will play a much larger role in factor-
price equalization than will trade (Hatton and Williamson 1998).
This out-migration of unskilled workers will cause wages to rise for the
unskilled in Mexico, while wages for the unskilled in the United States
will fall. The migrants themselves will see their incomes rise, and those
left behind in Mexico will be compensated by higher wages and remit-
tances. Critics of NAFTA (and free trade agreements more generally)
argue that it will lead to a "race to the bottom," as wages for the least
skilled fall. But this is not the case for workers in the sending country
(Mexico). Those most heavily affected will be unskilled workers in un-
skilled, labor-intensive sectors (such as textiles and apparel and agricul-
ture, see above) in the receiving countries (United States and Canada).
Sorting out the distributional effects of free trade (and migration) is
tricky, because much will depend on how quickly factor markets are inte-
grated. Capital markets are especially important, because if they are
quickly integrated, and exchange rate crises can be avoided (as with the
collapse of the peso in 1994), they can lead to higher levels of foreign
direct investment, building of infrastructure, and diffusion of technolo-
gies; all of which can help to close the productivity gaps between the
United States and Mexico. We already see considerable evidence in the
post-NAFTA period that capital is becoming cheaper and more readily
available in Mexico, despite the run-up in interest rates following the
peso crisis in the mid-1990s.
Another major problem in understanding the impact of NAFTA on
growth and inequality in Mexico is the fact that Mexico began its move
towards freer trade and investment precisely at the time in the 1980s and
1990s that Asian countries were entering the GATT/WTO. Competitive
winds, which would have been strong just with the opening of markets in
North America, were intensified by competition from labor-intensive,
Asian manufactures, especially China. During the Salinas liberalization
(1985-1990), Mexico had to compete with a flood of cheap Asian goods.
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The Maquiladora sector in particular took a big hit, leading at the end of
the 1990s to a sharp decline in these border industries, which had been
the mainstay of Mexican industrialization over a two-three decade pe-
riod. Recent evidence indicates that this sector is beginning to recover,
however, as capital and investments return from Asia to Mexico.
Rather than a "race to the bottom" we are witnessing a "race to the
middle" in Mexico, as living standards rise and a Mexican middle class is
emerging. Migration, trade, and the integration of capital markets in the
pre- and post-NAFTA period have raised output and living standards in
Mexico (Hanson and Harrison 1999). But there is no doubt that Mexico
has experienced a term of trade shock with accompanying radical shifts in
comparative advantage. One of the short-term consequences of this, as
Martin (2004) points out, is an increase in migration. Here it is important
to look at rising and declining sectors in the Mexican economy to see
where adjustment will be most difficult. Despite the fears of a collapse in
Mexican agriculture (particularly the corn sector), evidence presented
above shows that Mexico has held its own in agricultural exports to the
United States (in the fruits and vegetables sector).
As Mexico industrializes and modernizes agriculture, we are likely to
see increased inequalities and more migration in the short term. The par-
adox is that this divergence in development patterns is a necessary prel-
ude to the convergence (between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico) that will follow-things will get worse before they get better.
From a policy standpoint, the crucial questions are (1) how long will this
transition phase last, and (2) will there be enough political support in all
three countries to sustain the move to freer trade and investment during
this period?
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on our analysis of trade and migration patterns in North
America over the last two decades (and longer in some cases) we con-
clude that NAFTA did what is was supposed to do-increase the flow of
goods and services between NAFTA partners, but having no discernable
impact on the flow of legal migrants.
A. No EASY TRADEOFF BETWEEN TRADE AND MIGRATION
Income convergence in North America depends heavily on the contin-
uing integration of factor markets, particularly labor markets. The move-
ment of labor has a larger impact on factor prices, inequality and income
than trade, at least in the short term. This means that there will be big
pressures for migration to continue, and trade will be a complement, not
a substitute (see also Martin 2004). Migration, therefore, is likely to be
the motor for reducing inequality and alleviating poverty in Mexico for
the foreseeable future. Demand-pull forces in the U.S. economy remain
strong, and supply-push-especially demographic forces in Mexico-are
likely to persist for at least another ten to twenty years. Families in Mex-
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ico will continue to see migration to the United States as an important
strategy for developing and diversifying their income streams. Networks
between the receiving and sending societies operate like a cable connect-
ing the two poles of demand-pull and supply-push. The question (ad-
dressed below) is how to manage the increasing pressure to migrate.
B. ADVANCING THE FREE TRADE AGENDA AND THE
NAFIFA PROCESS
If, as the evidence strongly indicates, freer trade accelerates the process
of development, raising output, leading to a convergence of relative com-
modity prices, and ultimately reducing poverty and inequality in all three
countries, then it is important to push the NAFTA process forward, insti-
tutionalize it, and extend it to the rest of the hemisphere. Not only does
free trade have positive social and economic benefits, it also has impor-
tant political benefits. By more closely integrating the North American
economies, Mexico in particular is locked into a development path that
should lead to greater freedom and democracy, as well as closer coopera-
tion with the United States and Canada on a range of foreign policy and
security issues (Krugman 1993). The important question then is what are
the forces that would prevent further integration in North America?
Reasons for protectionism are many and varied, ranging from the eter-
nal search for an optimal tariff that will deliver the most favorable terms
of trade, while enhancing government (tariff) revenues, protecting infant
industries, etc., to narrow but well placed interests that are able to sub-
vert the policymaking and legislative process, serving specific groups, but
spreading the costs across society as a whole. One thing is clear, how-
ever: the integration process cannot be moved forward without political
leadership (government 101!) and the elimination of corruption, securing
of contracts and property rights, the reduction of distorting internal taxa-
tion policies, and the creation of a favorable climate for foreign
investment.
But if the Europeans are able to achieve greater regional integration,
with the economic benefits that this brings, why cannot the same be done
in North America, and eventually throughout the hemisphere (FTAA)?
Do such regional agreements aid or hinder the multilateral trade regime
(WTO)? Or as Sidney Weintraub (2002) puts it, are they "stumbling
blocks or stepping stones?"
In the current political and economic climate, it will be difficult to push
the free trade agenda. A political backlash against greater economic
openness has been building throughout the Americas since the late 1990s,
and it seems to be reaching its apogee in the first decade of the twenty-
first century. Demands for protectionism and immigration restriction
have been building throughout the OECD world, both on the right (cul-
tural conservatives) and the left (trade unionists). In the developing
world, particularly in Latin America, the danger of a nationalist backlash
and a new round of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is ever present. It will
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take considerable political skills and leadership to resist these populist
pressures.
C. MANAGING THE TRANSITION IN MEXICO AND CARING FOR
THE LOSERS
Until Mexico begins to close the development gap with the United
States and Canada, migration will continue at historically high levels.
Managing this movement of people (and the border more generally) will
be the biggest policy problem in the U.S.-Mexican relationship for many
years to come. It has less importance for Canada, because so few Mexi-
cans are able or willing to cross two international borders. Many at-
tempts have been made to achieve greater (unilateral) control over illegal
immigration from Mexico, including stepped up border enforcement,
greater internal controls (employer sanctions and the like), and even roll-
ing back some rights for immigrants, particularly access to welfare and
entitlement programs. But none of these measures has substantially re-
duced the flow of unauthorized immigrants, which responds more to the
business cycles in the United States and Mexico than to anything else.
Since it is unacceptable in a liberal democracy to have millions of peo-
ple living indefinitely outside of the social contract and working in the
informal sector (black market), legalization or amnesty is often the only
policy option. The problem with this solution is that it is temporary and
may actually increase the level of illegal immigration. Currently there are
estimated to be 10-12 million unauthorized immigrants living in the
United States, of which 5-6 million are Mexican. The administration of
George W. Bush, along with several members of Congress from both
sides of the aisle, have proposed various guest worker schemes, some in-
volving earned legalization. But the Bush proposal in particular, by
avoiding any link between participation in this program and legalization
or amnesty, fudges the crucial issue of status. Even if every illegal immi-
grant in the United States were allowed to apply for a green card, under
the current system-which limits the number of green cards or immigrant
visas to 140,000/year-it could take as long as fifty years to legalize every
unauthorized immigrant in the queue (Martin 2004). Cynics point out
that Bush may have made this proposal to curry favor with Hispanic vot-
ers in the run-up to the 2004 election. A more charitable interpretation is
that he was making a gesture to Mexico and President Vicente Fox,
knowing that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to pass immigration
reform in an election year.
In migration policy as with trade, it takes at least two to tango. Con-
trolling and managing migration-not to mention protecting against ter-
rorist infiltration and attacks-will require greater cooperation. Such
cooperation is an ongoing strategic game, not a one-off decision. Each
state must find an equilibrium point between economic growth (the bene-
fits that come from openness with respect to migration and trade), social
and political stability, and national security.
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Openness may increase levels of inequality in the short term, leading to
social instability and political backlash. The tolerance that each society
has for higher levels of inequality will vary, with Mexico having the high-
est tolerance, Canada the lowest, and the United States somewhere in
between. Canada should be best situated to cope with the disruptions
and instabilities that may accompany freer trade and higher levels of im-
migration, because Canada has a more developed welfare state and pro-
gressive tax system, with a range of automatic stabilizers that help
cushion the impact of openness on the losers (mostly unskilled, but also
some highly skilled workers). Mexico, on the other hand, has an almost
non-existent welfare state, with few automatic stabilizers (unemployment
compensation and the like), so we would expect integration to have the
greatest, disruptive effect in Mexico. Finally, it is important to point out
that the United States has one huge advantage, which is its size. Anti-
NAFTA rhetoric notwithstanding, the impact of North American integra-
tion on the U.S. economy and society is fairly minimal, with the glaring
exception of illegal immigration from Mexico, which is more of a social
and political than an economic problem.
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APPENDIX I A
FIGURE 1: TOTAL TRADE AS % OF GDP:
CANADA, MEXICO, AND U.S.
.. .Mexico
- Canada
Source: World Bank (2003)
TABLE 1:
ANNUAL % CHANGE OF TOTAL TRADE TO GDP
USA Mexico Canada
1965-2001 0.027 0.025 0.023
1965-1993 0.030 0.019 0.019
1994-2001 0.015 0.047 0.039
1994-2000 0.033 0.061 0.052
Source: World Bank (2003); own calculation
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau; own calculation
FIGURE 2C: U.S. TOTAL TRADE SHARES 1985-2003
T-- T Share Mexico
TT Share Canada
- TT Share NAFTA
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; own calculation
TABLE 2:
GROWTH RATES OF UNITED STATES' EXPORT, IMPORT
AND TOTAL TRADE SHARES
Export Import
Share Growth: Share Growth: TI Share Growth:
Mexico Canada Mexico Canada Mexico Canada NAFTA
86-03 0.040 0.001 0.038 -0.007 0.039 -0.004 0.009
86-93 0.040 -0.006 0.024 -0.009 0.032 -0.008 0.002
94-03 0.040 0.006 0.050 -0.005 0.045 0.000 0.014
94-00 0.070 0.010 0.077 0.003 0.073 0.006 0.027
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; own calculation
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TABLE 3:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EXPLAINING MEXICO'S
SHARE IN U.S. IMPORTS
Dependent Variable: log of Mexico's Share in U.S. Imports
Time Period: 1989-2001
Units: Manufacturing Industries (HTS 6-digit)
Explanatory Variables (in logs): Estimate T-Statistic
Tariff Preference 2.09* 2.80
Tariff Preference * NAFTA Dummy 2.37* 2.96
Tariff Level -2.47* -4.89
Tariff Level * NAFTA Dummy -1.97* -2.64
Transport Costs -6.67* -12.35
Lagged Import Share 0.21* 76.15
Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate 0.11* 3.00
Mexican Export Price -0.14* -11.63
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate -. 002* -19.38
World Export Price -0.03* -2.80
Number of Observations 27,809
R 2  .041
F-Statistic 191.9*
Note: * denotes statistical significance level of 1%; regression includes industry dummies at
HTS 2-digit level
Source: USITC (2003; Table B-2, p. B-10)
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TABLE 4:
GROWTH RATE OF CANADA'S EXPORT, IMPORT
AND TOTAL TRADE SHARES
Export Import
Share Growth: Share Growth: TT Share Growth:
US Mexico US Mexico US Mexico NAFTA
88-01 0.015 0.059 -0.003 0.107 0.007 0.090 0.009
88-93 0.016 0.043 0.002 0.139 0.010 0.109 0.011
94-01 0.013 0.077 -0.008 0.070 0.005 0.068 0.006
94-00 0.016 0.034 -0.002 0.112 0.008 0.090 0.010
Source: Statistics Canada; own calculation
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Source: World Bank (2003), IMF Financial Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Banco de Mex-
ico; own calculation
TABLE 5:
GROWTH RATE OF MEXICO'S EXPORT, IMPORT AND
TOTAL TRADE SHARES
Export Import
Share Growth: Share Growth: Tr Share Growth:
US Canada US Canada US Canada NAFTA
85-02 0.015 n/a -0.004 n/a 0.005 n/a n/a
85-93 0.008 n/a -0.007 n/a 0.000 n/a n/a
94-02 0.020 -0.031 -0.002 0.055 0.011 0.009 0.010
94-00 0.022 -0.021 0.011 0.049 0.018 0.008 0.017
Source: World Bank (2003), IMF Financial Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Banco de
Mexico; own calculation
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TABLE 6:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EXPLAINING US SHARE OF
MEXICAN IMPORTS
Dependent Variable: log of U.S. Share of Mexican Imports
Time Periods: 1991, 1995, 1999
Cross-Section Units: Manufacturing Industries (HTS 6-digit)
Explanatory Variables (in logs): Estimate T-Statistic
Tariff Preference 0.44* 2.73
Tariff Level in 1991 -0.84* 3.51
Import Share in 1991 0.49* 25.03
Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate -0.05* 2.39
Real Effective Exchange Rate -0.002* 4.66
Number of observations 12,049
R 2  0.29
F-Statistic 50.41*
Note: * denotes statistical significance level of 1%; regression
Includes industry dummies at HTS 2-digit level
Source: USITC (2003; Table B-4, p. B-12)
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APPENDIX I B
TABLE 7A:
US EXPORT SHARE WITH NAFTA PARTNERS BY SECTOR
Absolute
Annual % Annual % Change in %
change in change in change of
NAFTA exports NAFTA export NAFTA export NAFrA export
(as % of all) share share share between
87-93 and
Rank 1987 1993 2001 87-93 93-01 93-01
1 Energy+Fuel prod 21.78 22.39 48.49 0.47 19.42 18.95
2 Miner.+metals 44.48 38.40 49.32 -2.28 4.74 7.02
3 Transport. Equip. 40.53 36.03 41.52 -1.85 2.54 4.39
4 Textiles+Apparel 26.99 35.59 50.09 5.31 6.79 1.48
5 Forest+Fishery 22.07 30.10 42.98 6.06 7.13 1.07
6 Machine.+Electron. 26.68 29.18 30.97 1.56 1.02 -0.54
7 Services 15.46 15.97 14.60 0.66 -1.44 -2.10
8 Chem+Allied Prod 20.91 29.56 34.51 6.90 2.79 -4.10
9 Agriculture 9.77 18.97 27.52 15.70 7.51 -8.19
10 Misc. products 17.95 27.04 24.60 8.44 -1.50 -9.94
Source: USITC (2003); own calculations
TABLE 7B:
US IMPORT SHARE WITH NAFTA PARTNERS BY SECTOR
absolute
change in the
Annual % Annual % % change of
change in change in NAFTA
NAFTA imports NAFTA NAFTA import share
(as % of all) import share import share between
87-93 and
Rank 1987 1993 2001 87-93 93-01 93-01
1 Machine.+Electron. 13.07 15.86 24.13 3.55 6.52 2.97
2 Forest+Fishery 42.92 55.99 85.37 5.07 6.56 1.49
3 Services 16.57 15.41 15.13 -1.40 -0.23 1.16
4 Misc. products 7.75 10.05 14.96 4.95 6.10 1.15
5 Miner.+metals 29.38 32.32 32.57 1.67 0.10 -1.58
6 Energy+Fuel prod 23.80 35.03 51.90 7.87 6.02 -1.85
7 Chem+Allied Prod 20.72 25.78 27.83 4.07 0.99 -3.08
8 Transport. Equip. 31.49 42.27 44.86 5.71 0.76 -4.94
9 Agriculture 21.23 32.20 38.78 8.62 2.55 -6.07
10 Textiles+Apparel 4.02 8.82 17.31 19.88 12.03 -7.85
Source: USITC (2003); own calculations
2005] THE ROLE OF NAFTA
TABLE 7C:




Annual % Annual % % change of
change in change in NAFTA total
NAFTA total trade NAFTA total NAFTA total trade share
(as % of all) trade share trade share between
87-93 and
Rank 1987 1993 2001 87-93 93-01 93-01
1 Forest+Fishery 35.49 43.99 69.98 3.99 7.39 3.40
2 Energy+Fuel prod 23.49 33.08 51.58 6.81 6.99 0.18
3 Miner.dtals 33.81 35.13 38.99 0.65 1.37 0.72
4 Machine.+Electron. 18.66 21.92 26.96 2.90 2.88 -0.03
6 Services 15.95 15.76 14.82 -0.25 -0.74 -0.50
5 Transport. Equip. 34.51 39.53 43.63 2.42 1.30 -1.13
7 Chem+Allied Prod 20.83 27.90 31.03 5.66 1.40 -4.25
8 Agriculture 14.51 23.73 32.39 10.60 4.56 -6.05
9 Misc. products 10.63 15.91 18.14 8.28 1.75 -6.53
10 Textiles+Apparel 6.67 14.06 23.01 18.47 7.97 -10.50
Source: USITC (2003); own calculations
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FIGURE 6A: TOTAL U.S. IMMIGRANTS 1986-2002
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FIGURE 6B: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. 1986-2002
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Source: U.S. INS Statistical Yearbook; own calculations
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FIGURE 6D: SHARE OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 1986-2002
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TABLE 8:
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF U.S. IMMIGRANT
SHARES 1986-2002
Mexican Canada "NAFTA"
86-02 0.112 0.042 0.094
86-93 0.168 0.085 0.139
94-02 0.068 0.008 0.058
94-00 0.087 0.014 0.076
Source: U.S. INS Statistical Yearbook; own calculations
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FIGURE 7A: IMMIGRATION VS TRADE SHARE GROWTH -









Source: U.S. INS Statistical Yearbook; own calculations
FIGURE 7B: IMMIGRATION VS TRADE SHARE







Source: U.S. INS Statistical Yearbook; own calculations
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TABLE 9:
RELATION BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND TOTAL TRADE
SHARE GROWTH
Mexico-U.S. Canada-U.S. Mexico-U.S. Canada-U.S.
Correlation Coefficient Estimate T-statistic Estimate T-statistic n
85-02 0.185 0.085 1.766 0.703 1.197 0.318 16
85-93 0.301 0.252 6.101 0.707 4.512 0.582 7
94-02 0.193 -0.414 0.552 0.521 -3.157 -1.205 9
Source: U.S. INS Statistical Yearbook; own calculations
